

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 05446 01 OF 03 130053Z

64

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 ACDA-19 EB-11 IO-14 DRC-01 AF-10

SCEM-02 OMB-01 /169 W

----- 105028

P 122135Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2643

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5446

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: DRAFT REPORT TO NATO MINISTERS ON MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION

REF: USNATO 4952

SUMMARY: THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAS NOW CIRCULATED ITS REVISED DRAFT REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (DPA(73)279 - AVAILABLE THROUGH NATO REGISTRIES). IN ACCORDANCE WITH OCT 15 POLADS DECISION (REPORTED REFTEL), THIS NEW DRAFT, WHICH REPLACES DPA(73)234 OF SEPTEMBER 25, 1973, TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE OCT 6 RESUMPTION OF ISRAELI-ARAB HOSTILITIES. LIKE PREVIOUS MEDITERRANEAN REPORTS, IT CONFINES ITSELF TO THE EFFECTS THAT RECENT EVENTS MAY HAVE HAD ON SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE AREA. THE REPORT WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE ALLIED DRAFTING GROUP NOVEMBER 19-23 AFTER CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 05446 01 OF 03 130053Z

WHICH IT WILL BE PROPOSED FOR COUNCIL APPROVAL AND TRANSMISSION TO THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN DECEMBER.

AT THIS DELICATE POINT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND IN

ALLIANCE RELATIONS THE TASK OF PRODUCING A CURRENT MEDITERRANEAN ASSESSMENT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THE TASK OF PRODUCING ONE NOW THAT WILL HAVE MEANING A MONTH FROM NOW IS MORE DIFFICULT. GIVEN THOSE CONSIDERATIONS, MISSION CONSIDERS THE SUBJECT DRAFT A REASONABLE FIRST CUT.

REQUEST INFO ADDRESSEES SEND COMMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT, INFO USNATO. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE BY NOVEMBER 16. END SUMMARY.

1. KEY PORTIONS OF DRAFT REPORT FOLLOW:

BEGIN TEXT

II. ASSESSMENT

A. POLITICAL

50. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS LATEST OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING, THE MOVEMENT TO RALLY THE ARAB COUNTRIES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF KING FAISAL, AND PARTICULARLY THE REINTEGRATION OF JORDAN IN THE ARAB WORLD, TAKE ON THEIR FULL SIGNIFICANCE. WHILE SADAT'S REPEATED THREATS OF AN INEVITABLE SHOWDOWN WITH ISRAEL WERE NO LONGER BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY ANYONE, HE WAS PATIENTLY PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. THE SUPPOSITION PUT FORWARD IN LAST SPRING'S REPORT HAS TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE. REALIZING THAT THE VARIOUS TACTICS HE HAD EMPLOYED SO FAR WERE NOT PRODUCING THE RESULTS HE WANTED, SADAT DECIDED TO BREAK OUT OF WHAT HAD BECOME A COMPLETELY FROZEN POLITICAL SITUATION. HIS AIM SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TWO-FOLD: SHARPLY TO FOCUS WORLD ATTENTION ON THE CONTINUING DEADLOCK IN A CONFLICT WHICH NO LONGER SEEMED TO INTEREST IT AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO OBTAIN TERRITORIAL BARGAINING COUNTERS AGAINST DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS THAT FORMED PART OF HIS PLAN.

51. MANY PRECONCEIVED IDEAS THAT HAD BECOME INGRAINED WITH TIME AND THAT HAD LED TO THE GROWTH OF A GENERAL PUBLIC BELIEF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 05446 01 OF 03 130053Z

THAT IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT TURNED OUT TO BE WRONG. THE ARAB SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE AGAINST ISRAEL ASSERTED ITSELF, IRRESPECTIVE OF DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL REGIMES OR LEARNINGS. IN THIS RESPECT, THE ATTITUDE OF KING FAISAL IS ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY. ALTHOUGH REPUTEDLY MODERATE AND PRO-WESTERN, BY TAKING PART IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS (ALBEIT WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL FORCE) AND CARRYING OUT HIS THREATS REGARDING OIL SUPPLIES, HE CHOSE TO AVOID CRITICISM BY THE ARAB EXTREMISTS, EVEN AT THE RISK OF FACILITATING THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE PROMINENT ROLE PLAYED BY FAISAL MAY, IN FACT, ACCOUNT FOR GADAFY'S ASTONISHING FAILURE TO TAKE PART IN THE CONFLICT. THE MORALE AND FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE ARAB SOLDIERS WERE ALSO NOTABLE AND THEY PROVED THEIR INCREASED ABILITY

TO HANDLE SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. ISRAEL'S LEGENDARY INVINCIBILITY CAME IN FOR SOME HARD KNOCKS, AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE CONFLICT. DOUBTLESS, THE FACT THAT THESE PRECONCEIVED IDEAS HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED WILL NOT FAIL TO HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPERCUSSIONS.

52. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET-EGYPTIAN DISAGREEMENT WAS OVER-ESTIMATED. THE EXPULSION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY ADVISERS FROM EGYPT IN JULY 1972 LOOKS IN RETROSPECT MUCH MORE LIKE A POLITICAL THAN A MILITARY OPERATION. IT NOW SEEMS CLEAR THAT, UNDER SOVIET AUSPICES, THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY MACHINE WAS, IN FACT, COMPLETELY OVERHAULED AND THAT THIS RESULTED IN STIFFER DISCIPLINE AND BETTER LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB ARMIES. MOSCOW DID NOTHING TO DISSUADE THE ARABS FROM RESUMING HOSTILITIES. THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO EVENTS WHICH PROVE THAT IT KNEW WHAT WAS ABOUT TO HAPPEN. FIRST, TWO DAYS BEFORE THE FIGHTING STARTED, THE FAMILIES OF THE SOVIET TECHNICIANS SERVING IN EGYPT AND SYRIA, AND POSSIBLY SOME OF THE TECHNICIANS THEMSELVES, WERE SENT HOME BY AIR. SECONDLY, A RUSSIAN COSMOS-TYPE OBSERVATION SATELLITE WAS BROUGHT BACK TO EARTH ON THE VERY EVE OF THE WAR.

53. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT HESITATE TO GIVE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY TO SAFEGUARDING ITS POSITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS THINGS TURNED OUT, IT MADE MARKED PROGRESS IN REFURBISHING ITS IMAGE, ESPECIALLY IN SYRIA. IT ALSO SCORED POINTS AGAINST THE CHINESE, WHO HAD RECENTLY BEEN CONSTANTLY UPBRAIDING MOSCOW OVER ITS LUKEWARM SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB CAUSE.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 05446 01 OF 03 130053Z

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 05446 02 OF 03 130053Z

64
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 ACDA-19 EB-11 IO-14 DRC-01 AF-10

SCEM-02 OMB-01 /169 W
----- 105017

P 122135Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2644

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 5446

B. MILITARY

(A) APRIL TO 6TH OCTOBER

54. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHANGED IN SO FAR AS THE SOVIET THREAT TO NATO WAS CONCERNED DURING THIS PERIOD.

55. THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF SOVIET FORCES BEING STATIONED IN SYRIA NOR OF A RETURN OF SOVIET FORCES TO EGYPT.

56. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVMEDRON REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT AFTER THE RETURN OF A NUMBER OF SHIPS TO THE BLACK SEA FOLLOWING THE SPRING EXERCISE. THE EARLIER WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIETS TO TRANSPORT MOROCCAN FORCES AND EQUIPMENT TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 05446 02 OF 03 130053Z

SYRIA WAS REPEATED AND THIS WAS THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT SOVIET MOVE. THE SQUADRON'S LACK OF AIR RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES COULD BE, AND MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY A SATELLITE SYSTEM, BUT THE LACK OF AIR STRIKE CAPABILITY CONTINUED TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL OF THE FORCE.

(B) 6TH OCTOBER TO 30TH OCTOBER

57. IN SPITE OF THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE SOVMEDRON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IS STILL ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, IN SO FAR AS THE SOVIET THREAT TO NATO IS CONCERNED. HOWEVER, THE ENLARGED SOVMEDRON COULD POSE AN INCREASED THREAT IF IT WERE DIRECTED AGAINST NATO. FURTHERMORE, THE SQUADRON IS PRESENTLY CONCENTRATED INTO A SMALL AREA IN THE EASTERN BASIN RATHER THAN SPREAD THINLY THROUGHOUT THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA AS USUAL.

C. ECONOMIC

58. THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CUSTOMERS FOR OIL AND THE PRODUCING ARAB COUNTRIES IS BECOMING EXTREMELY ACUTE. THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH OIL WAS SUPPLIED HAS BEEN SWEEPED AWAY. THIS TRAIN OF EVENTS SEEMS TO SOME EXTENT TO HAVE CAUGHT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES UNPREPARED. IN THE CONFUSED AND EMOTIONAL CLIMATE CREATED BY THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN THE ARAB WORLD, NO

CLEAR PICTURE EMERGES AS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH CONSUMERS AND PRODUCERS COULD GET TOGETHER AGAIN.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

A. POLITICAL

59. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SHOW CLEARLY THAT AS A RESULT OF THE INFLUENCE IT HAS GAINED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIET UNION IS IN A POSITION TO EXPLOIT ANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION WHICH COULD SERVE THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THE RISKS TAKEN BY MOSCOW IN BACKING ITS ARAB CLIENTS PROVIDE PROOF THAT PENETRATION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA IS A BASIC ELEMENT OF KREMLIN STRATEGY. ANOTHER NOTEWORTHY FACTOR IS THE DANGEROUS AUTOMATICITY WHICH CHARACTERISED MOSCOW'S CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 05446 02 OF 03 130053Z

REACTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS DUTY-BOUND TO EXTEND VIRTUALLY UNCONDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THE SUPPORT OF WHICH, FOR HIGH ON 20 YEARS, HAS BEEN AN INTEGRAL PART OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. THIS CONSTANT SOVIET ATTACHMENT TO INTERESTS WHICH ARE DIMAETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THOSE OF THE WEST ENGENDERED A SERIOUS RISK OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

60. THE RECENT CONFLICT WAS A STARTLING REMINDER THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS A POWDER-KEG - A PATENT FACT WHICH HAD, PERHAPS, COME TO BE SOMEWHAT OVERLOOKED DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS. IT HAS NOW BECOME A COMPELLING NECESSITY TO REACH A JUST, LASTING AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE DIPLOMATIC BASIS FOR SUCH A SOLUTION MAY HAVE IMPROVED EVER SO SLIGHTLY. RESOLUTION 338 OF 22ND OCTOBER, 1973 REFERS TO RESOLUTION 242 BUT IT ALSO STIPULATES "THAT, IMMEDIATELY AND CONCURRENTLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, NEGOTIATIONS START BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES AIMED AT ESTABLISHING A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST".

B. MILITARY

(A) APRIL TO 6TH OCTOBER

61. THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE AREA REMAINED UNCHANGED. THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO SYRIA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT TO EYGPT, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO CONTINUED. THE IMPROVEMENT OF ARAB MILITARY POTENTIAL IN QUALITATIVE TERMS DURING THE LAST 12 MONTHS WAS SUCH THAT A DETERIORATION IN THE UNSTABLE MIDDLE EAST AREA BECAME RATHER MORE LIKELY AND IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT IF THIS WERE SO, DOUBTLESS THE SOVIETS WOULD USE IT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.

(B) 6TH OCTOBER TO 30TH OCTOBER

62. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR ON NATO. DOUBTLESS THERE ARE MANY LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

BUT THIS WILL TAKE TIME AND CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE WHICH IS NOT AVAILABLE AT PRESENT. THE FUTURE STRENGTH OF THE SOVMEDRON WILL MERIT CAREFUL ATTENTION. WHILE IT REMAINS AT ITS PRESENT STRENGTH IT COULD POSE A THREAT TO THE SOUTHER REGION.

63. ONE OF THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IS WHETHER THE SUEZ CANAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 05446 02 OF 03 130053Z

WILL BE REOPENED SINCE THIS WOULD MEAN A GREAT IMPROVEMENT IN THE FLEXIBILITY OF DEPLOYMENT AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET NAVY.

C. ECONOMIC

64. THE VARIOUS STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARAB COUNTRIES WITH REGARD TO OIL AND THE CUTBACK IN DELIVERIES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MEAN THAT FOR THE PRESENT EXPORTS HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY OVER TWO MILLION BARRELS A DAY OR 100 MILLION TONS PER ANNUM. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SITUATION IN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE LATTER'S DEPENDENCE ON ARAB OIL IS LIMITED SINCE IT ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY ABOUT 5 PER CENT OF UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE OIL IN 1972. ON THE OTHER HAND, NEARLY THREE QUARTERS OF ALL CRUDE OIL IMPORTS BY WESTERN EUROPE COME FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THE CLOSING DOWN OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PIPELINES AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES' CURTAILMENT OF OUTPUT WILL INEVITABLY FORCE THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SOONER OR LATER TO REDUCE THEIR OUTPUT OF REFINED PRODUCTS. APART FROM THE IMPACT OF THIS SITUATION ON INTERNAL CONSUMPTION IN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INDIVIDUALLY, THE CAPACITY OF THOSE COUNTRIES TO EXPORT REFINED PRODUCTS COULD BE SERIOUSLY REDUCED. SUSPENSION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTS BY EUROPE WOULD BE KEENLY FELT BY THE UNITED STATES WHICH OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAVE CLAMPED DOWN ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF REFINERIES AND DELIBERATELY OPTED FOR IMPORTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.

65. THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE PREVIOUS REPORT ON THE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES ARE PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT (SEE C-M(73)49(REVISED), PARAGRAPH 65). THERE HAS NOW BEEN A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION, IF SUCH WERE STILL NEEDED, OF THE INTEREST, FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, OF AN ENERGY POLICY WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO MAKE THE FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL EFFORT NEEDED TO PRESS AHEAD QUICKLY WITH THE QUEST FOR SOURCES OF ENERGY WHICH COULD GRADUALLY BE SUBSTITUTED FOR ARAB OIL. THIS WOULD OPEN THE ROAD TO THE RESTORATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKET OF THE FLEXIBILITY AND OPTIONS WHICH IT NOW LACKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 05446 03 OF 03 130144Z

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 ACDA-19 EB-11 IO-14 DRC-01 AF-10

SCEM-02 OMB-01 /169 W

----- 105452

P 122135Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2645

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 5446

IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

66. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, THE CHANGED SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE LATEST ARAB-ISRAELI CLASH HAS SHOWN THAT THE CEASFIRE MUST BE FOLLOWED BY AN EFFORT TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING A SUBSTANTIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISREALI DISPUTE, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH MUST BE TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA. THE ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO ENCOURAGE THE OPENING OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE MILITARY FIELD, THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IS INTENDED FOR USE IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET AIMS AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY IT REPRESENTS A THREAT TO NATO WHICH WARRANTS KEEPING SUFFICIENT ALLIED FORCES IN THE AREA. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, THE ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD CONSULT TOGETHER IN ORDER TO DIMINISH THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 05446 03 OF 03 130144Z

DECISIONS ON THEIR OIL SUPPLIES.

SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAR

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN IMS OPINION OF THE ROLE OF THE SOVMEDRON IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAR. IT DOES NOT COMPARE THE SOVMEDRON CAPABILITY WITH THAT OF THE NATO NATIONS AS WE HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE NATO FLEETS, IN PARTICULAR THE US SIXTH FLEET. FURTHERMORE, THIS OPINION HAS BEEN MADE IN ADVANCE OF ANY NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS. IF NECESSARY, WE WILL

OF COURSE, AMEND OUR JUDGEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF SUCH NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS.

2. ON THE 6TH OCTOBER, THE SOVMEDRON CONSISTED OF 2 CRUISERS, 7 DESTROYERS, 5 ESCORTS, 2 MINESWEEPERS AND 2 LANDING SHIPS. THEY HAD A SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE CAPABILITY OF 32 LAUNCHERS AND 40 MISSILES AND A SURFACE-TO-AIR CAPABILITY OF 242 MILLILES ON 22 LAUNCHERS.

3. ON THE 23RD OCTOBER THE FORCE CONSISTED OF 3 CRUISERS, 12 DESTROYERS, 6 ESCORTS, 2 MINESWEEPERS AND 6 LANDING SHIPS WITH A SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE CAPABILITY OF 48 MISSILES TO 36 LAUNCHERS AND A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE CAPABILITY OF 360 MISSILES ON 30 LAUNCHERS.

4. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SHIPS ON THE 6TH OCTOBER WAS QUITE TYPICAL FOR PEACETIME. ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR THE SHIPS WERE MOVED TOWARDS THE EASTERN BASIN. A STRONG SURVEILLANCE EFFORT WAS PUT ON THE US CARRIER FORCE OPERATING SOUTH OF CRETE AND DURING THE WAR 4 MISSILE DESTROYERS WERE BROUGHT INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ONE SVERDLOV CRUISER WAS ALSO ADDED TO THE FLEET. THIS CRUISER, A GUN-SVERDLOV AND ONE MISSILE DESTROYER CAME IN SPECIFICALLY FOR A LONG-ARRANGED VISIT TO ITALY WHICH WAS CONDUCTED AS PLANNED AND ON COMPLETION MOVED TO THE KITHERA ANCHORAGE.

5. THE NUMBER OF LANDING SHIPS HAS TRIPLED AND THEY HAVE BEEN USED TO PROVIDE A SEA-LIFT OF EQUIPMENT TO SYRIA. IN THE LATTER DAYS OF THE WAR THEY HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH A DESTROYER ESCORT WHILST ON PASSAGE NORTH OF CYPRUS AND INTO THE SYRIAN COAST.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 05446 03 OF 03 130144Z

6. WITH A WAR SITUATION OF THIS MAGNITUDE IN WHICH SOVIET INTERESTS WERE HEAVILY COMMITTED AN INCREASE OF THIS NATURE IS NOT SURPRISING. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS IT WOULD BE FOLLY FOR ANY NAVAL COMMAND NOT TO PROVIDE A STRONGER DESTROYER ESCORT FOR THEIR CRUISERS AND THE PROVISION OF A FIGHTING ESCORT FOR THEIR AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS WHICH HAVE A VERY LIMITED DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THEIR OWN, AND WHICH WERE PROCEEDING WELL INSIDE AIR COVER FROM ISRAEL WHILST EMPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL'S ENEMIES.

7. THE SUBMARINE COUNT HAS BEEN UNCERTAIN DURING THE WAR AND MAY THROUGHOUT HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS LARGER THAN IT REALLY WAS. THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE TURNOVER OF THE STANDING PATROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN OCCURRED ON THE DAY WAR BROKE OUT AND THE GROUP DUE TO RETURN TO THE NORTHERN FLEET MAY NOT HAVE DONE SO. THOSE THAT DID RETURN, DID SO COVERTLY, AND THEREFORE A CERTAIN COUNT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE.

8. TO SUMMARIZE THE SOVMEDRON ACTIVITIES OVER THE LAST THREE WEEKS, IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN NORMAL

SEAMANLIKE STEPS TO PROTECT THEIR BIG SHIPS AND VULNERABLE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS IN A WAR ENVIRONMENT AND HAVE MAINTAINED A CLOSE WATCH ON THE US SIXTH FLEET UNITS IN THE SAME AREA. IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS THEY HAVE MAINTAINED A LOW PROFILE. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THEY WITHDREW ALL THEIR SHIPS FROM EGYPTIAN PORTS AND, APART FROM THE SEALIFT SHIPS, FROM THE WAR ZONE.

9. ONE OF THE FACTORS WHICH MADE THE COUNT OF SOVMEDRON SURFACE COMBATANTS SEEM HIGH, IS THAT TRADITIONALLY WE HAVE INCLUDED AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS IN THE SURFACE COMBATANT CAPABILITY, WHEREAS IN FACT THEY HAVE AN EXTREMELY LIMITED ROLE AND ONLY SELF-DEFENCE GUN-POWER. IF THESE SIX SHIPS ARE EXTRACTED FROM THE COUNT AND THE SHIPS WHICH CAME IN FOR A PEACETIME VISIT ARE DISCOUNTED, THE NUMERICAL INCREASE IS NOT AS SIGNIFICANT AS IT MIGHT HAVE APPEARED TO BE; THE INCREASE IN THE DESTROYER COUNT WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN A VERY NATURAL PRECAUTION FOR THE SOVIETS TO TAKE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

END TEXT
RUMSFELD

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: mcintyresh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO05446
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731165/abqcedgh.tel
Line Count: 455
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 4952
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: mcintyresh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13-Jul-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <20-Aug-2001 by mcintyresh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DRAFT REPORT TO NATO MINISTERS ON MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ANKARA
ATHENS
LONDON
PARIS
ROME
USDOCOSOUTH

USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005